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The campaigns at St. Mihiel and Meuse Argonne are examples of operational art by the AEF. The significant amount of munitions needed for these operations required operational art to integrate the operational plan. Both of these operations deal with the difficult task of getting munitions from the theater supply system to the point of tactical employment. This task is critical to operational art in the areas of culmination, operational reach, phasing and tempo. Quarters (GHQ) staff sections. 1 These documents give the official version of AEF events in 1 John J. Pershing, Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces (1920) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1920 Mark Grotelueschen's study on the evolution of combined arms tactics employment from Cantigny to Meuse Argonne is a key work in understanding the evolution of tactics, doctrine, and operational art. 7 Grotelueschen takes an in depth look at the doctrine as described by General
Pershing and compares it with the training received from the French and the actual employment of the AEF from early divisional operations through the AEF's planning and execution of the Meuse Argonne campaign.
There are very few works dealing specifically with operational art and the AEF. There are even fewer dealing with logistics. The Neck of the Bottle by Phyllis Zimmerman is one of the only major works that deals with logistics. This work is limited to the national industrial mobilization and only a limited study on the effects of the national mobilization on the operational employment. 8 No discussion is given on the logistics issues faced in theater by the AEF or how theater logistics interfaced with the operational problems faced by the 1st Army AEF.
Many of the major authors listed above briefly indicate that ammunition was a significant factor in the planning and conduct of major operations. 
DEFINITIONS AND TERMS
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, defines operational art as "the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose." 9 This is the core of the analysis of the AEF's actions at St. The railhead and division ammunition train as employed in WWI operations are the functional equivalent to the modern Brigade Support Battalion . The railhead and ammunition train had the final responsibility of getting the ammunition to the tactical user. In this scheme, the depot would ship ammunition to the railhead using the theater transportation system of the day (railroads), for issue to tactical units. The ammunition train would then transport the ammunition from the railhead to the unit on the front line.
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The system of ammunition delivery described above also illustrates the role of the regulating officer. This individual was a representative of the AEF G4 who controlled the issue of supplies, primarily ammunition, during operations throughout WWI. The G4 authorized the release of munitions to tactical formations (mainly corps size elements arms perspective or a logistics perspective. This lack of capability led the allies to request the American contribution be that of replacement manpower to the allied armies already in the field.
This was not acceptable to the leadership of the U.S. for domestic political reasons as well as long-term strategic bargaining power at conflict termination.
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The U.S. lack of strategic shipping allowed the allies to influence what was shipped to
France from the U.S. Since the allies wanted the AEF to provide additional combat power to replace depleted French and British armies the allies would only commit sea transport to combat divisions and not the troops required to support them operating as an independent force. 22 This piecemeal shipment of operational forces drove the AEF planners to a dependence on the French theater logistics system. The dependence on the French logistics system is apparent in the procurement of weapons and munitions to their employment at the front. General Pershing described the dependence on the French for munitions and arms as follows in his memoirs:
Except for four 14 inch naval guns on railway mounts, the American First Army throughout its entire service on the front did not fire an American-made cannon or shell and no American-made tank was ever available in Europe for use in battle. The AEF Service of Supply purchased in theater nearly all of the artillery, machine guns, and munitions from French manufacture or in the case of Meuse Argonne, the munitions issued from depots previously supporting French field armies.
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At first look, the above situation appears to be a model in allied cooperation. However, it does not present how U.S. strategic interests were limited and operational employment affected.
Since Secretary of War Newton Baker directed General Pershing to employ the AEF as an independent force, he was severely limited to where he employed that force. significant factor in how the First Army performed in St. Mihiel and the Meuse Argonne. These factors would later influence General Pershing in the development of a unified allied logistics system to enable the employment of an independent AEF field army.
OPERATIONS AT ST. MIHIEL
The operation at St. Mihiel highlighted the first opportunity for the AEF to demonstrate its abilities operating at the Army level towards a theater objective. In the summer of 1918, the allies had just halted the last major German offensive of the war. 24 The allies agreed to appoint
Marshall Ferdinand Foch as the senior allied commander to unify allied actions on the western front. General Pershing and the AEF were building both combat power and experience fighting in limited capacities under British and French forces.
Marshall Ferdinand Foch and the other senior allied leaders saw an opportunity for a major combined allied offensive following the failed German assaults of early 1918. Foch envisioned a series of small offensives to take key terrain and improve the overall allied lines. He had four specific salients in mind that needed elimination. British and French armies with varied but increasing levels of AEF support carried out the first three. 25 The final action was the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient to the southwest of the fortress city of Metz.
At St. Mihiel General Pershing saw his opportunity for forming the AEF into a field army with control of an American sector of the front. 26 This was a critical element of U.S. theater strategy in having the AEF operate as an independent force against the Germans. For a multitude of reasons, it was advantageous to develop and employ the American forces as an independent 24 Trask, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 84.
25 Ibid., 101.
26 Pershing, Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces (1920), 225-231. field army. This is in stark contrast to how the Allies wanted the AEF amalgamated into existing French and British command structures and used essentially for replacements for other allied armies. The main strategic reason against amalgamation for the U.S. was that of improved post conflict position of the U.S. at the table of international power. 27 The U.S. argument against amalgamation was a strategic issue. The U.S. resistance to amalgamation is also critical to understanding the American concept of operational art in WWI -employing U.S. forces in tactical actions to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. It is this decision not to amalgamate that allowed the AEF to operate independently and in so doing provide a foundation for American operational art in the 20 th century. The employment of the AEF as an independent force is the strategic foundation that allows the AEF to develop and employ its own operation art. Munitions were a central factor in the ability of the AEF's ability to operate independently. Additionally munitions and their continual supply is a pillar in developing a campaign quality army with the ability to project power across time and space within a theater.
The ability to project power across time and space is the essence of operational reach. The supply of munitions was a critical requirement in developing a durable and protected formation. This ability to supply munitions across a theater was a particular problem that the AEF needed to solve prior to any major independent AEF operations. Munitions were particularly problematic due to the dependence of the AEF on both French artillery munitions and weapons for the duration of the war. In early 1918, General Perishing began to push for a more synchronized and unified approach to allied logistics, including ammunition.
The need for a synchronized approach to allied logistics was important to General
Pershing because he saw it as a critical enabling function to developing an independent AEF. As mentioned in the strategic context section, the allies and the U.S. were at odds when it came to what type of troops and equipment were shipped and when. This resulted in two separate sources of supply for the AEF: one from the U.S. and a separate source in France. 28 The sources of supply 
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The result of the need for a unified system of allied supply was the Military Board of Allied Supply. This board consisted of a senior logistics representative for each allied or associated power nation. 30 The Allied Board of Supply provided the needed vehicle to examine and improve the flow of munitions between allied armies and the rear areas. The problem for the AEF was its distribution system was in its infancy well into 1918.
Additionally the theater campaign plan envisioned by Marshall Foch did not have the AEF operating in an area in which its distribution system existed. Hannonville in the north. 32 The army operational objective was directly linked to the further objective; the line of exploitation was specified in the 1st Army Field Order to facilitate followon operations.
This plan was tremendous in scale by modern standards. The concentration of over four corps size formations in an area no more than 50 square kilometers was particularly dense. The operation was to consist of over 3,000 pieces of artillery firing in a synchronized operation with advancing infantry. 33 Any significant disruption of artillery rounds would cause the plan to become unhinged since the movement of the infantry assault elements depended on preparatory artillery fires. In this application, artillery coupled with a constant supply of ammunition was critical in controlling the tempo of the overall operation. 31 Pershing, Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces (1920) The battle that ensued accomplished the operational and theater strategic objectives. The northern and southern assault forces linked up at 2 a.m. on 13 September and eliminated the salient. First Army reached the army objective line later the same day with consolidation and reorganization happening through 16 September. 41 The AEF planners had set operational objectives referred to above as "army objectives" that each corps formation needed to achieve.
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The operational objectives effectively reduced the salient, which accomplished Marshall Foch's 40 Coffey, "St Mihiel Offensive The Problem of Ammunition Supply", 3.
41 American Battle Monuments Commission, 111.
42 Drum, "Field Order No. 9, " 203. theater strategic objective. Finally, the AEF had operated for the first time as an independent force providing a strategic victory for the U.S. and improving their standing among the allies.
Throughout, munitions resupply provided a foundation to accomplish objectives and was a deciding factor as to what approach the AEF selected. This brief explanation is only to highlight the linkage and accomplishment of operational actions, attainment of operational objectives, and the meeting of theater strategic goals accomplished by the AEF at St. Mihiel.
The AEF mitigated their initial ammunition issues by the forward positioning of ammunition to the nine railheads activated for the operation down to the battery level. While this was effective for the initial preparatory fires and ensuring the infantry was able to make their initial advance it limited the further operational reach of the formations. This is an interesting tension in munitions supply. In this case, the massive amounts of ammunition delivered to the railheads and artillery units at the jump off line demonstrated the operational reach of the AEF to concentrate an army for an attack. However, it also demonstrated how the same actions limited the further operational reach and hastened the culmination of the operation due to the inability of tactical formations to further advance the ammunition supply. In this example, the later statement is supported by the fact that it took over three weeks to remove the propositioned ammunition from the corps and divisional artillery positions.
Senior leaders of the AEF debated if AEF had culminated at the close of the St. Mihiel offensive. There were many senior officers, General Pershing included, who believed the St. ammunition issues were apparent. The division had to halt operations due to a lack of ammunition in the division area. The division had not properly synchronized the clearance and construction of roads to facilitate the movement of the division artillery and the division ammunition train. This caused a delay in the seizure of an army level operational objective.
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The ammunition problems experienced by the 79th Division affected tempo and operational reach. The munitions resupply problems delayed the taking of an operational objective. This slowed the overall operation of the 1st Army. This also demonstrated how shortages in munitions at critical junctures can significantly reduce the ability of an army to project force in terms of operational reach.
After reprioritizing engineer assets to repair the road network, the attack proceeded. This was only a temporary fix in this case. The amount of ammunition required for the specified tactical tasks given to the division artillery was not available in the division area and had to be supplied from the railhead. This seems to be a routine task but rough calculations indicate that the number of Liberty truckloads of artillery ammunition to be upwards of 1,000 truckloads of 75mm and 155mm shell to a forward area. This is significant for two reasons. The number of trucks presented a challenge due to the chronic truck shortage in the AEF and across the allied theater. 56 Secondly, the state of the roads was still fragile after the engineer effort. This was perhaps a critical factor since the extreme amount of concentrated traffic required to transport the munitions would have caused additional problems. Montfaucon is significant for both its value as a key piece of terrain that controls the terrain around it and as a major artillery target and thereby a large consumer of artillery ammunitions. The attack of First Army hinged upon the artillery at various levels to neutralize the enemy fire on Montfaucon and the ability of the 79th to seize and hold it from counter attack. All of these key tasks were dependent upon having the requisite amounts of ammunition for the tactical artillery tasks assigned in the right place on the battlefield sequenced at the correct time.
Here the ammunition supplied to the artillery is a critical requirement as a protection function for the fielded forces. Without the timely supply of munitions, the fielded forces, the 79th division in the case, were unnecessarily exposed to the enemies' artillery and machine gun fire.
The situation around Montfaucon between 28 and 29 September shows a linkage between ammunition supply and several elements of operational art. This difficulty with transportation and movement of ammunition and artillery is indicative of a phasing problem in the overall operations. ADRP 3-0 refers to phasing as the division of an operation by durations or activity. In this case, the phasing did not occur and it resulted in the inability of the engineer troops to complete the required roads for the transport of ammunition as required for the artillery to accomplish their tactical tasks. The phasing problem caused a degradation of operational reach and reduced the endurance of the formation. Referring back to figure 2, this had the effect of lengthening the conceptual pipe between the regulating station (node A) and the unit railhead (node B) as indicated on the diagram. This extended the First Army's culmination point.
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The supply annex however is not nearly as robust in its instructions. It consists of only two entries concerning small arms to the artillery and the other giving a controlled supply rate for the Hotchkiss machine gun used in anti-aircraft defense. In combination with the extensive transportation network instructions, this seems to indicate the AEF staff perceived little issue with the amount of ammunition available for issue in the overall army area of operations but had great difficulty in getting it to where it needed to be.
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As the second phase unfolded reports of ammunition problems are virtually nonexistent at the operational level. Tactical reports from the division and below indicate there was an amount of friction in tactical ammunition resupply but these issues did not translate into operational problems, as did the 79th Division's ammunition problem in and around
Montfaucon. 68 The lack of apparent munitions issued overlaid with the large geographic area covered by the second operation is indicates that the better sequencing of forces to did improve munitions resupply and artillery movement.
Remarks from Colonel Marshall's memoirs also support the above conclusion. In reference to the Meuse Argonne operations, he states the following:
The SOS furnished the army with the necessary supplies and the army, in turn, placed these according to custom, at the railhead of each division. It was within the division that the trouble lay. Modern logisticians and operation maneuver planners must manage the seams between modern distribution networks to avoid the same kind of frictions experienced by the AEF. This management of the seams is the justification for modern concepts like total asset visibility and just in time logistics. These systems if used properly provide the force the ability to see problems and overcome the challenges in getting munitions to the warfighter at the correct time in space while putting the minimal amount on the ground and providing the commander flexibility. These concepts have similarities to the AEF's distribution network as described in figure 2. The "pneumatic buffer" at the regulating station is representative of how the AEF attempted to provide flexibility and insurance to the operating force.
The seam between the tactical executers and the theater is the area where the AEF The seams between distribution systems also require the attention of both logistics and maneuver operational planners. The considerations for the maneuver of logistics support must be coordinated into the operation and integrated across warfighting functions. The requirement for specific considerations and instructions in the plan is shown by the correlation between the instructions regarding the ability to move supplies and forces and munitions problems reported by commanders. As the AEF's planning and orders process matured more specific instruction and considerations were given to road construction, traffic control, and munitions issue.
The need for the operational pause to allow the Army to extend its lines of communications and enhance its operational reach is also a consideration for operational planners. As the U.S. Army moves out of a decade of fighting from static locations during the conflicts of the early 21st century the institutional knowledge needed understand the mobility limitations found during maneuver warfare have decreased. The historical experiences of the AEF can provide a reference point for how and where large American armies have used operational pauses to extend operational reach. The pause between the first and second Meuse Argonne operations exemplifies such a pause.
Planners also need to consider the capabilities of units to move ammunition in a maneuver centric operation. Planners must not assume that the BSB has the organic capability to distribute the required ammunition to BCT units to accomplish the tactical tasks given to artillery and maneuver elements. As the situations faced by the 79th and 35th divisions illustrate, the ability of a tactical unit to link to the theater logistics system to accomplish operational objectives must be considered during the planning stages. If short falls exist in capabilities, they must be mitigated by shifting resources or, as Colonel Marshall noted, the approach must be changed.
The final area for consideration is future research and developments that would enhance the operational reach, phasing, tempo and culminating qualities of U.S. Army operational formations. There have been many significant developments in aids to transportation since WWI.
The 20' container and roll out flat rack are two of the more significant advances in munitions resupply. This development eliminated the need for trans loading and excess cargo handling that the AEF experienced at its theater depots and railheads. Further developments in munitions shipping could give the Army an enhanced ability to execute operational art.
When thinking of munitions shipment it is worthy to note that the main munitions used today have changed little in size and weight since WWI. Current artillery systems fire both 75mm and 155mm rounds of nearly the same shipping size and weight as those procured from the This is where the science of logistics can improve operational art.
